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During the first decade after its chaotic
birth, Pakistan sought to form a strate-
gic alliance with the United States. The
bilateral relationship during the Cold
War was based on U.S. interest in a
strong anti-Soviet ally in Asia and Paki-
stan’s desire for backing against India.
This incongruence set up the two coun-
tries for misperceptions and unfulfilled
expectations that have lasted to the
present day.
The relationship was further compli-
cated in the period after the Cold War
as U.S.-Pakistan ties frayed over Paki-
stan’s nuclear weapons program and
the Soviet threat disappeared. As the
United States began to scrutinize Paki-
stan more closely for democratic prac-
tices and nuclear proliferation, the
pro-American tilt within the Pakistani
military began to wane. A series of per-
ceived slights (such as Washington’s re-
fusal to deliver F-16 aircraft after
Pakistan had paid for them) and the ef-
fective cessation of the bilateral military
relationship contributed to this collec-
tive attitude. Although the terrorist at-
tacks of 11 September 2001 resurrected
the relationship, it remains to be seen
whether the current bilateral coopera-
tion can be sustained for the long term,
given the various pressures that the cur-
rent president, General Pervez Musharraf,
is facing.
Haqqani ends the book with a chapter
that summarizes his findings and offers
suggestions for U.S. policy. Although
his diagnosis of U.S. policy toward Pa-
kistan is sound, we would benefit from
a bit more detail about some of his pol-
icy proposals. That is a minor short-
coming; Haqqani has provided an
excellent work on understanding the
nexus between Pakistan’s religious es-
tablishment and military, and on the
implications of this relationship for Pa-
kistan’s future.
AMER LATIF
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Director, South Asian Affairs
Brown, Malcolm, ed. T. E. Lawrence in War and
Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of
Lawrence of Arabia. London: Greenhill, 2005.
320pp. $39.95
This is a timely book. It is a collection
of rarely read wartime reports and post–
World War I articles that wrestle with
the consequences of war and were writ-
ten by the British officer T. E. Lawrence,
otherwise known as Lawrence of Ara-
bia, one of the greatest theoreticians
and practitioners of modern guerrilla
warfare.
Lawrence, of course, is best known for
his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
which describes the British-inspired-
and-supported Arab revolt against their
Ottoman suzerain. Lawrence is back in
vogue again, which is not surprising
given the involvement of the United
States in a seemingly intractable and
protracted insurgency in Iraq. Many of-
ficers, officials, and academics are turn-
ing to The Seven Pillars of Wisdom for
nuggets of information about insur-
gency warfare, or, indeed, about the
Arabs themselves. In his foreword, Pro-
fessor Michael Clarke of King’s College
London says that the book “has become
an oft-consulted work among military
officers presently struggling with the at-
tempt to create order in Iraq.” The
Seven Pillars of Wisdom is wonderful
prose, but as Malcolm Brown puts it,
the work is “no pushover even for the
most adept of skim-readers.” It is in
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fact more often quoted than read, and I
suspect few people get much beyond its
key chapter on the principles of insur-
gent warfare.
That is where this collection comes in.
It is not only timely, given the renewed
interest in this unorthodox officer and
his theories on guerrilla warfare, but ex-
tremely valuable for Lawrence’s in-
depth analyses of the military situation
in the Arabian Peninsula and of the dif-
fering fighting styles of an irregular force
like the Bedouins and a conventional
modern army like that of the Turks.
The book’s first section is a valuable
and detailed introduction by the editor,
putting Lawrence into historical con-
text as a guerrilla warfare theorist and
practitioner. The heart of the book is di-
vided into two parts. Part 1 shows us
Lawrence caught up in the rigors and
challenges of war. It consists of his dis-
patches on the irregular war in the penin-
sula that appeared in a British intelligence
publication in Cairo, the Arab Bulletin—a
periodical that thanks to Lawrence and
many colleagues was not sullied by turgid,
army-style language.
Two superb dispatches in part 1 are es-
sential for officers who want to under-
stand irregular warfare. The first, titled
“Military Notes,” was written in No-
vember 1916. It brilliantly lays out the
strengths and weaknesses of the irregu-
lar Arab forces facing the Turks. Under-
stand their weaknesses and make use of
their strengths and advantages, is what
Lawrence is saying about these Arab
units. The second dispatch, “Twenty-
seven Articles,” written in August 1917,
tells how to deal with the Hejaz Arabs. It
warns, “Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art,
not a science, with exceptions and no
obvious rules.” (The Hejaz is the north-
western coastal zone of present-day
Saudi Arabia, where most of Lawrence’s
campaigning took place.) This piece has
come to the attention of many officers
serving in Iraq, particularly those in
advisory capacities with Iraqi forces and
officials. However, it is not clear that
they fully understand this caveat that
Lawrence attached: “They [the articles]
are meant only to apply to Bede [Bed-
ouin]; townspeople or Syrians require
totally different treatment.” Clearly, the
Iraqis are different from the Syrians and
the Hejaz Arabs, whether Bedouin or ur-
ban dwellers. Lawrence makes clear the
tremendous value of understanding the
culture during war, something in which
the United States has been particularly
inept—not least in trying to suggest,
whether implicitly or explicitly, that
Lawrence’s twenty-seven articles might
unlock the secrets of Iraqi behavior.
Part 2 shows Lawrence trying to “cope
with the consequences of war in the cir-
cumstance of peace.” While much of it
is of historical interest, a number of
points are as interesting as the dis-
patches in part 1. I refer specifically to
“Demolitions under Fire” of January
1919, which discusses the Arab insur-
gents’ extensive use of sabotage against
Turkish infrastructure in the Arabian
Peninsula, particularly against the stra-
tegically important Hejaz Railway and
its bridges. Equally informative is “Mes-
opotamia: The Truth about the Cam-
paign” (August 1920); it brilliantly and
scathingly castigates the British for their
failures and their lies in Mesopotamia, a
territory captured from the Ottomans
and now known as Iraq. However, the
two most important articles here are
“Evolution of a Revolt,” written in Oc-
tober 1920, and “Science of Guerilla
Warfare,” 1929. Both are readily avail-
able elsewhere, including online, but
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Malcolm Brown has done a great ser-
vice for those interested in Lawrence’s
ideas by including them here.
In conclusion, this is a superb addition
to the literature on guerrilla warfare. I
enjoyed reading it. Lawrence’s prose
and clarity of thinking and exposition
made it doubly enjoyable.
AHMED HASHIM
Naval War College
Symonds, Craig L. Decision at Sea: Five Naval Bat-
tles That Shaped American History. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2005. 378pp. $30
What history buff could possibly resist
the subtitle “Five Naval Battles That
Shaped American History”? Those so
enticed will not be disappointed in
Craig Symond’s exceptionally well writ-
ten and fascinating accounts of these
American naval battles: Oliver Hazard
Perry’s far-reaching victory over the
British in the 10 September 1813 battle
for Lake Erie; the 8–9 March 1862 bat-
tle of Hampton Roads (which ended in
a draw) between America’s first iron-
clad ships, USS Monitor and CSS Vir-
ginia; the 1 May 1898 battle of Manila
Bay; the 4 June 1942 battle of Midway;
and the 18 April 1988 Operation PRAY-
ING MANTIS in the Persian Gulf.
Because the American navy was absent,
Symonds does not list the most crucial
naval battle in American history, the
early September 1781 battle of the
Capes, in which a French fleet pre-
vented the British from resupplying
Lord Charles Cornwallis’s besieged
troops at Yorktown. Nonetheless, he
provides a detailed account of this bat-
tle, describing it as “the battle that
secured American independence.”
Symonds places special emphasis on
crucial command decisions. In this
case, he notes, for example, that at a
critical moment the British com-
mander, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves,
hoisted a flag signal whose ambiguity
resulted in failure to concentrate the
fleet’s fire on the French, who in large
measure prevailed because of this
blunder.
This book’s considerable historical
value resides as much in Symonds’s
highly interesting and detailed descrip-
tion of the British background as in the
actual battles. For example, most of us
learned in school that impressment by
the British of American sailors into the
Royal Navy was the prime cause of war
in 1812—but I was surprised to read
here that some ten thousand were so
impressed. While we all knew about
Perry’s victory at Lake Erie and his fa-
mous report, “We have met the enemy
and he is ours,” few have a true idea of
its significance. In Symonds’s words,
“Perry’s victory secured the northwest-
ern frontier for the United States”—the
threat that greatly concerned us.
Symonds’s descriptions of the condi-
tions in which men fought at sea are
also masterful. This is especially so in
his comparison of the conditions on
sailing ships with those of the ironclads,
Monitor and Virginia.
Symonds notes that in terms of casual-
ties Virginia inflicted before Monitor’s
arrival “the worst defeat in the history
of the United States Navy until Pearl
Harbor.” The episode clearly spelled the
end of an era in naval warfare. The lop-
sided 1898 victory over the Spanish at
Manila Bay, for its part, left the United
States “an acknowledged world power”
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